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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
P H Y L L I S LANG, \ 
Plaintiff-Appellant, \ 
vs. ! { Case No. 
J . R O B E R T LANG, 
Defendant, 
S A M U E L J . CARTER, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E K I N D O F CASE 
This is an action for a garnishee judgment against 
a Utah resident who has been appointed by the Cali-
fornia Court, executor of the estate of a California 
decedent, and who holds money in Utah which the Cali-
fornia Court has ordered to be paid to Defendant. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Phyllis Lang, obtained a 
garnishee judgment against Intervenor and Respond-
ent, Samuel J . Carter, executor, pursuant to Mr. Car-
ter's answers to a garnishment duly served upon him. 
Intervenor and Respondent moved the court to set aside 
the garnishee judgment. The Court, the Honorable 
Ray Van Cott J r . presiding, granted the motion. From 
the order setting aside the garnishee judgment Plain-
tiff appeals. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the order setting aside 
the garnishee judgment. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Pursuant to judgments in the aggregate amounts 
of $13,480.00, garnishments were issued, (R-1&2), to 
Plaintiff and duly served February 27, 1964 upon In-
tervenor, Samuel J . Carter, both individually and as 
executor, (R-3). Mr. Carter answered one of the gar-
nishments, (R- l ) , stating that he had in his possession 
$9,375.00 owing to Defendant, J . Robert Lang. A 
garnishee judgment, (R-4), was obtained against Mr. 
Carter and a garnishee execution was issued, (R-5), 
and duly served upon him on February 28, 1964, (R-6). 
On March 5, 1964, (R-20-6), Mr. Carter filed a com-
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plaint in Interpleader, (R-20-1), and served the same 
on Plaintiff, (R-20-8). Mr. Carter stated that he was 
appointed Executor of the Estate of John Lang, de-
ceased, by the California Court, (R-20-1), and that 
that court had made and entered its order directing 
Mr. Carter to pay the sum of $19,500.00 to Defendant, 
(R-20-2). Mr. Carter admitted, (R-20-3), that he 
claimed no beneficial interest in the subject money 
and that he had already paid of this sum $10,125.00 
to an attorney in Salt Lake City, one Wilford Burton, 
at the direction of Defendant, (R-20-4). Mr. Burton 
was joined by Mr. Carter as a party Defendant in 
the Interpleader Action, (R-20-9), and moved to dis-
miss, (R-20-16). Argument on this motion was had 
before the Hon. Judge Aldon J . Anderson, (R-13), at 
which time Franklin Riter, Esq., representing Mr. 
Carter, stated that the subject funds were in Utah, 
that a final order had been entered by the California 
Court directing Mr. Carter to pay the money to De-
fendant and that Mr. Carter was a mere stakeholder 
and was therefore competent to institute an action in 
Interpleader in the Utah Courts as a foreign executor. 
The Hon. Judge Aldon J . Anderson denied the motion 
to dismiss, (R-20-26). At this point Tracy-Collins 
Bank & Trust Co. was granted leave to intervene, both 
in the subject case, (R-8), and in the companion Inter-
pleader Case, (R-20-28). Intervenor, Tracy-Collins 
Bank & Trust Co., maintained that Defendant had 
assigned the subject money to it, (R-20-29), by instru-
ment dated February 29, 1964, (R-20-34) ; this alle-
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gation Mr. Carter readily conceded, (R-20-37). Mr. 
Carter then moved the Court to set aside the garnishee 
judgment, (R-10), on the grounds that the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, had no 
jurisdiction over him in his capacity as foreign executor, 
( R - l l ) . The Court, the Hon. Ray Van Cott J r . pre-
siding, granted the motion, (R-15). From this order 
Plaintiff appeals, (R-17). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I. 
ONCE A D I S T R I B U T I V E S H A R E O F A N 
E S T A T E H A S B E E N A S C E R T A I N E D A N D 
O R D E R E D P A I D , T H E P R O P E R T Y M A Y B E 
R E A C H E D BY A J U D G M E N T C R E D I T O R 
O F A N H E I R I N A G A R N I S H M E N T PRO-
C E E D I N G . 
I t is well settled that once a distributive share of 
an estate has been ascertained and ordered paid, the 
property is no longer in custodia legis and may be gar-
nished by a judgment creditor of the heir. 4 Bancroft 
Probate Practice 2nd, Vol. 4, p. 504; 59 ALR 777; 6 
Am Jur 2nd, Attach. & Gam. par. 214. 
Prior to the order of distribution, the general rule 
is that a distributive share of an heir will not be subject 
to garnishment while in the hands of the court-ap-
pointed administrator or executor. The California Court 
6 
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in Dunsmoor v. Furstenfeldt, (Cal.), 26 Pac. 518, 
states the reason for this rule and the rule that pertains 
following an order of distribution: 
"The only reason assigned by the authorities 
for the rule prohibiting the attachment of prop-
erty in the custody of the law is that such attach-
ment would generally delay and embarrass judi-
cial and other official proceedings in the adminis-
tration of such property and that this is a suffi-
cient reason for the rule, as applied to all judicial 
proceedings in regard to such property, is gen-
erally admitted; and to this extent the weight 
of authority admits no exception to the rule. 
But, according to a great preponderance of the 
modern cases, there are some exceptions to the 
rule applied to property in the custody of purely 
executive officers, based on the maxim that the 
rule should not be applied when the reason of 
the rule ceases . . . (Emphasis Supplied) . . . 
. . . When defendant has a right to a certain 
distributive share of the fund in the hands of a 
receiver, master in chancery, or trustee of the 
court, the officer may be effectually garnished 
by a creditor of the party so entitled, after the 
court has ordered it to be paid. 
"The authorities seem to concur in holding 
receivers and similar officers liable to garnish-
ment when they have in their hands a definite 
sum to which the defendant or judgment debtor 
is clearly entitled, and the officer has nothing 
more to do with the fund than to pay it over. 
Some of them may go beyond, but none, so far 
as they have been examined, fall short of this 
conclusion." 
7 
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The language used in 59 ALB 778 in noting the 
Illinois Case, Bartell v. Baumann, 12 111. App. 450, is 
typical of that used by the courts in most jurisdictions: 
"Subsequently to the decree of distribution, 
each share is finally and definitely ascertained, 
and a cause of action exists, therefore, against the 
representative in his individual capacity in favor 
of the distributee." 
Wherever this point has arisen in the western 
states, the courts have followed this line of reasoning; 
thus the California Court said In Re Nerac, 35 Cal. 
392, at page 397: 
"By the decree each share is finally and defi-
nitely ascertained, and a cause of action there-
after exists against the administrator in favor 
of the distributee, and we are unable to perceive 
why, on the score of public policy, or anything 
else, the money thus judicially determined to be 
due from the administrator to the distributee 
should not be within the reach of the creditors of 
the latter . . . We consider it clear that, after 
distribution has been decreed, an executor or 
administrator may be garnished . . . " 
Similarly, the Colorado court said in Isbell-Kent-Oakes 
Dry Goods Co. v. Larimer County Bank h Trust Co., 
(Colo.) 226 Pac. 293, at page 294: 
"I t is said that the widow's allowance was in 
custodia legis. Not so. I t had been ordered by the 
court to be paid to her, and the administrator 
had no duty but to pay it. I t was a debt from him 
to her." 
8 
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And the Oregon Court held in Harrington v. LaRocque, 
(Ore.) lOPac. 498: 
"I t may be considered clear that when the dis-
tributive share of an heir has been ascertained, 
and ordered to be paid by the court, it is no 
longer regarded as in the custody of the law. 
The right to it has become fixed, and the executor 
ceases to hold in his representative, but in his 
personal, capacity. After distribution has been 
decreed, it may, therefore, be garnished in the 
hands of the executor." 
In the instant case, Respondent, Mr. Carter, ad-
mits that he was appointed executor of the estate of 
John Lang by the California Court, and that the court 
had made and entered its order, directing Mr. Carter 
to pay the sum of $19,500.00 to Defendant, J . Robert 
Lang. Mr. Carter further admits that he paid, of this 
sum, $10,235.00 to an attorney, Wilford Burton, in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, at the direction of Defendant, 
J . Robert Lang. On February 28, 1964, Mr. Carter 
answered a garnishment under oath, stating that he 
had remaining of the original $19,500.00 owing to 
Defendant, J . Robert Lang, in his possession $9,375.00. 
There is no qualification to the answer. I t is therefore, 
obvious that the funds held by Mr. Carter for the 
Defendant were no longer part of the assets of the 
estate of the California decedent and not in custody of 
the law of the California court, but were the uncon-
ditional property of the Defendant and as such wrere 
subject to garnishment by the Plaintiff. Indeed, as set 
forth above, Mr. Carter admitted paying out of the 
9 
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fund $10,125.00 to a Utah attorney at the direction 
of the Defendant. As a matter of fact, Mr. Carter 
obviously feels that the Defendant could, two days fol-
lowing Plaintiff's garnishment, assign the balance of 
the funds to the Intervenor, Tracy-Collins Bank & 
Trust Company. I t is indeed strange that Mr. Carter 
would press upon this court the anomalous situation 
that funds in his possession in Utah could be assigned 
by a non-resident to a Utah attorney and a Utah bank 
but could not be garnished by a Utah resident-creditor 
of the non-resident Defendant. 
P O I N T I I . 
F O R E I G N E X E C U T O R S M A Y S U E OR B E 
S U E D U N D E R C E R T A I N CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The courts generally follow the law as stated in the 
Restatement of the Law, Conflict of Laws, Par. 512, 
p. 617: 
"No action can be maintained against any ad-
ministrator outside the state of his appointment 
upon a claim against the estate of the decedent/' 
(Emphasis supplied). 
The rationale given is as follows: 
"The administrator holds the assets of the 
decedent which come into his possession subject 
to the directions of the court which appointed 
him, and is responsible only to that court. For 
a court in another state to order payment from 
10 
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assets of the decedent in the hands of the foreign 
administrator would be an improper interference 
with the administration by the court in the first 
state" (Emphasis supplied). 
In Wilcox v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 
2 Utah 2nd 227, 272 Pac. 2nd 157, this court said: 
"We adhere to the principle enunciated in the 
Restatement which appears to cover the case be-
fore us." 
Respondent, Mr. Carter, and, indeed, the lower 
court relied on the Wilcox Case for the blanket propo-
sition that a foreign executor had no standing in the 
courts of Utah under any circumstances. I t is respect-
fully submitted that such is not the law. This writei 
has noted that the cases following the general rule, 
(Wilcox Case), are uniform in that at least one of the 
following is present: 
(1) The action is against the Defendant in his 
representative capacity as executor or administra-
tor, as in the Wilcox Case. 
(2) The foreign administrator is sought to be 
substituted for the deceased, as in the Wilcox Case. 
(3) The foreign administrator is not personally 
within the state nor personally served within the 
state, as in the Wilcox Case. 
(4) The property of the estate is not within the 
forum, as in the Wilcox Case. 
(5) The assets of the estate are being attacked, 
as in the Wilcox Case. 
11 
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In the subject case the proceeding is not against 
Mr. Carter in his representative capacity as executor 
of the estate of John Lang, but rather in his capacity 
as a personal debtor to the Defendant. 
In the subject case no attempt is being made to 
substitute Mr. Carter as a party for the deceased. 
In the subject case Mr. Carter is within the State 
of Utah and has been properly served within the State 
of Utah. 
In the subject case the assets of the estate of the 
deceased are not being attacked, but rather funds that 
were ordered by the California Court to be paid by 
Mr. Carter to Defendant, J . Robert Lang. 
A review of cases following the general rule indi-
cates that there is not a single instance wherein the rule 
is applied to suits attacking a distributive share held 
by an executor after a decree of distribution, for in 
such an action a foreign executor is not acting in his 
representative capacity in behalf of a foreign estate, 
but as a mere stakeholder of the distributive shaire. 
Even when an action is brought against a foreign 
executor in his representative capacity and against the 
general assets of an estate before a decree of distri-
bution, the courts have allowed certain exceptions to 
the general rule. For instance, (1) where a failure of 
justice would follow if equity withheld relief, or (2) 
where the foriegn representative had put himself in 
the position of an individual wrongdoer, or (3) where 
12 
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there was a res within the jurisdiction to be disposed 
of or preserved, the courts have realistically excepted 
the general rule. 53 ALB 2nd 325; McAndrews v. 
Krause, (Minn.), 71 N W 2nd 153; Allsup v. Allsup, 
18 Tenn. 283; Cerrone v. Trans World Airlines, 
(N.Y.), 148 NYS 2nd 162. 
In Mc Andrews v. Krause supra, the court ex-
plained: 
"As a general rule, a foreign representative 
in his capacity as representative of an estate may 
not be sued in any jurisdiction outside of the 
state in which he was appointed . . . There is an 
exception to this rule, however, when under cer-
tain circumstances assets are within the forum's 
jurisdiction and the action is of an equitable 
nature . . . 
"The Plaintiffs presently find themselves in 
such a position that they would be unable to get 
jurisdiction over Krause were they to commence 
a proceeding in Iowa because he is a Minnesota 
resident, and also because a substantial portion 
of the assets are in Minnesota. Under such cir-
cumstances an equity court will recognize an ex-
ception to the general rule. 
" . . . In actions in equity, where it is necessary 
to prevent a failure of justice, jurisdiction will 
be assumed at least so far as the relief to be 
secured relates to property in the jurisdiction 
of the court' 
"The rule in Virginia is to the same effect. 
Sylvania Industries Corporation v. Lilienfelds 
Estate, 132 Fed. 2nd 887, 890, 145 A L R 612. 
"Since Executor Krause is a resident of Min-
13 
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nesota and since there is property within the 
state over which this state's power extends, we 
hold that the personal service of the summons 
and complaint in this action is sufficient to en-
able the district court to acquire personal juris-
diction over him as representative of the estate 
at least insofar as property in this state is con-
cerned." (Emphasis supplied). 
I t will be noted that in the above case an action 
was allowed against the foreign executor in his repre-
sentative capacity, against the general assets of the 
estate within the forum, and before a decree of distri-
bution; in the subject case the action is against a for-
eign executor in his individual capacity as a mere stake-
holder against an adjudicated share after the court has 
ordered the amount to be paid. There is no "interfer-
ence with the administration by the court" of California. 
P O I N T I I I . 
A F O R E I G N E X E C U T O R IS NOT A R E A L 
P A R T Y I N I N T E R E S T W H E N A M E R E 
S T A K E H O L D E R . J U R I S D I C T I O N I S OB-
T A I N E D B Y S T R I C T A D H E R E N C E TO GAR-
N I S H M E N T S T A T U T E S . 
As seen above, many courts have spoken of an 
administrator and executor as having doffed his official 
robes after the court which appointed him has ordered 
him to pay specific funds to specific persons; at that 
moment he becomes rather a personal debtor of that 
person designated by the court to be paid by the rep-
14 
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resentative of the estate. There is no contention by 
Mr. Carter that he is other than a stakeholder or that 
he has any beneficial interest in the funds which are 
the subject of this case. 
For the purpose of determining diversity of citizen-
ship, Federal Courts have held that an interpleader is 
a custodian or stakeholder of property and is merely 
a nominal party whose citizenship does not affect the 
question of jurisdiction; that the claimants of the funds 
held by the stakeholder are the real contestants and 
their citizenship and not that of the stakeholder deter-
mines jurisdiction. Cramer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. 
Co. of Hartford, Conn., et al., (8th Cir.), 91 Fed 2nd 
141; Federal Reserve Bank v. Omaha National Bank, 
(8th Cir.), 45 Fed. 2nd 511. Similarly, Mr. Carter's 
official citizenship as an executor in a California Court 
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts, when 
Mr. Carter is acting as a mere stockholder. 
A garnishment is a proceeding quasi in rem, 38 
CJS 205. Moneys not in custodia legis and within the 
four corners of the forum are therefore liable to a pro-
ceeding quasi in rem even without personal jurisdiction, 
87 A L R 485. The statutory requirements in the subject 
case were strictly adhered to as regards the service of 
the garnishment and the subsequent judgment, and 
therefore jurisdiction was obtained over the subject 
money, regardless of whether or not the voluntary 
answers of Mr. Carter to the garnishment gave this 
court jurisdiction over his person, as held in Graham 
15 
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v. Hidden Lake Copper Company, 53 Utah 230, 178 
Pac. 64. 
CONCLUSION 
I t is mete and right, that the law as we know it 
have broad guidelines and general, well-established prin-
ciples which to follow. However, in each individual case, 
the court should search the interstices of the law as per-
tains to the set of facts before it. There are many well 
known exceptions to the so-called hard and fast rules 
of law, such as, exceptions in cases that would seem at 
first blush to come under the statute of frauds. The 
case at hand is one in point. The fact that Mr. Carter is 
labeled a foreign executor does not change the fact 
that he is a mere debtor of Defendant, having in 
his possession in Utah money which he admits owing 
the Defendant. Mr. Carter is able and, it would appear, 
eager to pay that money to someone—someone other 
than the Plaintiff. I t is neither just nor equitable that 
this court should compel a Utah resident to go out of 
this jurisdiction to satisfy Utah judgments in a foreign 
court when the money in controversy is no longer of any 
interest to that court and in fact is in Utah and part 
of which has been assigned to other Utah residents by 
the non-resident debtor of Plaintiff. 
The order of the lower court setting aside the gar-
nishee judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D U D L E Y M. AMOSS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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